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Abstract
In the past few years, widespread frustration with sprawling
development patterns has precipitated an explosion in innovative
thinking and action across the United States. This new thinking –
generally labeled as “smart growth” – contends that the shape and
quality of metropolitan growth in America are no longer desirable or
sustainable. It argues that metropolitan areas could grow in radically
different ways if major government policies on land use, infrastructure
and taxation were overhauled.
This essay discusses the current state of smart growth and metropolitan
thinking in the United States. It outlines the demographic, market and
development trends that are affecting metropolitan areas and the
consequences of these trends for central cities, older suburbs, newer
communities and low-income and minority families. It describes how
current government policies facilitate the excessive decentralization of
people and jobs and how smart growth reforms are being enacted,
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particularly at the state level, to shape new, more urban-friendly, growth
patterns. It concludes by identifying the major challenges that smart
growth needs to address if it is going to succeed in shaping new,
sustainable metropolitan communities.
Keywords: Smart growth, sprawl, metropolitan governance,
decentralization, urban revitalization, economic competitiveness,
sustainability, tax and regulatory policy
JEL Number: R000
1Foreword: Divided Cities – What Britain can learn from
America
Around the globe, cities are growing at an incredible rate. In 2001 there
were 19 mega-cities of over 10 million, and 392 cities of over 1 million
people (UNCHS, 2001). The scale of urbanisation is vastly greater and
faster in the developing world of the South, creating life-threatening
over-crowding in sprawling informal settlements.
Europe, with its longer-running urbanised societies, and the
United States, still in some ways regarded as a frontier society yet
rapidly hitting the buffers of traffic congestion, unmanageable sprawl
and opposition to further outward growth, are struggling to contain
over-urbanisation. Urban polarisation within cities and suburban sprawl
by more affluent households around the edges is creating unmanageable
tensions over land-use, the “right to drive”, immigration and racial
inequality.
In the United Kingdom, the problems of concentrated poverty in
older inner city areas, now commonly bracketed under the umbrella of
social exclusion, are increasingly matched by the continuing low-density
greenfield house building, the popularity of out-of-town shopping
centres, the ever-increasing reliance on cars, the resulting loss of viable
bus and other transport solutions, the sharp divisions in school
standards between cities and their hinterlands, and the seemingly
sudden recognition of incipient racial segregation all over the country.
This sharp divide within cities has become a generator of “white
flight” by more affluent households to the outskirts (Cantle, 2002).
The problem of cities was the focus of the Urban Task Force set up
by the British Government and chaired by Richard Rogers, the
international architect. This move gave an unexpectedly high profile to
the problem of depleted, decaying cities and straggling, low-density,
unsustainable outer growth. It advocated “compact cities”, shorthand
for concentrated revitalisation of existing urban infrastructure, reuse of
abandoned brownfield land, the creation of more socially mixed, and
therefore more viable, inner neighbourhoods. It argued strongly that
building on Greenfield land at extreme low density – on average 25
homes to the hectare or 10 homes to the acre – was unsustainable
socially, economically, and environmentally. As a result, 40% of all new
building land goes under tarmac, mostly funded by the Government.
Far more seriously the Government is forced to fund the expensive
declining inner city services and also meet the long-term costs of the
2demand by expanding more affluent outer areas for better schools,
environmental conditions, roads and so on.
In a sea-locked and heavily urbanised and crowded island, this
pattern cannot last. Developers know it, the Government too, and most
of all the people who have fought and paid for their privileged suburban
lifestyle. Each new development – houses, roads, supermarkets – is
heavily contested.
It was an eye-opener to many housing, social policy and planning
experts to learn in February 2002 that the United States, with 25 times
the land per person that the UK has, was grappling with and starting to
tackle similar problems. This paper, by Bruce Katz of the Brookings
Institution and urban policy adviser to many American mayors,
metropolitan and state governments, sets out the American case against
sprawl, the new experiments in “smart growth” or “compact urban
development” as Richard Rogers calls it, and the government-level
policy shifts in its favour. Many of these problems are growing in the
United States in parallel with UK and European concerns over similar
issues – the impact of increasing car use on cities and their surrounds.
We can learn greatly from the American experience. Our urban
society is more compact, more racially integrated, more public service
oriented. Yet the urban trends in this country and elsewhere in Europe
suggest an alarming similarity, if not yet in intensity, at least in
direction. Sprawl and racial divisions, as the Government’s reports on
the Oldham, Bradford and Burnley race riots show, are in danger of
fuelling an explosive clash between north and south, between boom and
abandonment. This important paper should help shape the global
debate on sustainable urban development showcased in Johannesburg
in summer 2002, and in the UK at its first urban summit in Birmingham
in October 2002.
Anne Power
July 2002
3Introduction
In the past few years, widespread frustration with sprawling
development patterns has precipitated an explosion in innovative
thinking and action across the United States. This new thinking –
generally labelled as “smart growth” – contends that the shape and
quality of metropolitan growth in America are no longer desirable or
sustainable. It asserts that current growth patterns undermine urban
economies and broader environmental objectives and exacerbate deep
racial, ethnic and class divisions. It argues that these growth patterns are
not inevitable but rather the result of major government policies that
distort the market and facilitate the excessive decentralization of people
and jobs.
Across the country, smart growth language and rhetoric have
become common not only among political, civic and corporate leaders
but also among developers and other participants in the real estate
industry. A growing chorus of constituencies – corporations, local
elected officials, environmentalists, ordinary citizens – are demanding
that the market and the government change the way they do business
and take actions to curb sprawl, promote urban reinvestment and build
communities of quality and distinction. Governors and state legislatures
are responding by proposing and enacting important reforms in
governance, land use and infrastructure policies. Voters at the ballot box
are regularly approving measures to address the consequences of
sprawling development patterns.
This is a powerful paradigm shift, a sweeping rethinking of the
costs and consequences of metropolitan growth in the country. It offers a
compelling vision of how to achieve environmental quality, urban
revitalization, economic competitiveness and even racial and social
justice in metropolitan America.
This essay discusses the current state of smart growth and
metropolitan thinking in the United States. It outlines the demographic,
market and development trends that are affecting metropolitan areas
and the consequences of these trends for central cities, older suburbs,
newer communities and low-income and minority families. It describes
the rising tide of smart growth reforms, particularly at the state level. It
concludes by identifying the major challenges that smart growth needs
to address if it is going to succeed in shaping new, sustainable
metropolitan communities.
4How Metropolitan America Grows
The release of the 2000 US census created an almost euphoric mood
among many long-time observers of American cities. New York City
topped 8 million people for the first time. Cities left for dead not long
ago – Boston, Atlanta, Chicago – registered strong population growth.
With visible signs of prosperity in refurbished downtowns, with
immigrants spurring neighborhood revitalization, with homeownership
rates generally going up and poverty and crime rates generally going
down, many American cities are enjoying a hard-won optimism.
Yet a closer look at the census (and other market trends) shows
that the decentralization of economic and residential life, not the
renewal of core cities, remains the dominant growth pattern in the
United States. America’s cities and metropolitan areas are experiencing
similar patterns of growth and development – explosive sprawl where
farmland once reigned, matched by decline or slower growth in the
central cities and older suburbs. Suburban areas, some of which were
small towns a few decades ago, are capturing the lion’s share of
population and employment growth. In the largest metropolitan areas,
the rate of population growth for suburbs was twice that of central cities
– 9.1 percent versus 18 percent – from 1990 to 2000 (Berube, 2002).
Suburban growth outpaced city growth irrespective of whether a city’s
population was falling like Baltimore or staying stable like Kansas City
or rising rapidly like Denver. Even sunbelt cities like Phoenix, Dallas
and Houston grew more slowly than their suburbs.
Percentage growth only tells part of the story. More and more
people are living, working, shopping and paying taxes at the farthest
edges of metropolitan areas. Atlanta, often touted as a “turnaround
city”, is a case in point. The central city grew by a respectable 6 percent
during the 1990s and gained 22,000 people. Yet its metropolitan area
grew by 39 percent during this period and gained 1.1 million people.
Incredibly, rural counties dozens of miles from the central business
district gained more people – in both percentage and absolute terms –
than the city of Atlanta. Both Henry County and Forsyth County, for
example, more than doubled their population in the 1990s and now have
119,000 and 98,000 people respectively.
As people go, so do jobs. Consequently, the suburbs now
dominate employment growth and are no longer just bedroom
communities for workers commuting to traditional downtowns. Rather,
they are now strong employment centers serving a variety of functions
in their regional economies. The American economy is rapidly becoming
5an “exit ramp” economy, with office, commercial and retail facilities
increasingly located along suburban freeways. This is particularly true
in leading technology regions like Washington, D.C., Austin and Boston
where firms like American Online, Dell and Raytheon have built large
exurban campuses far from the city center.
As Edward Glaeser and Matthew Kahn have recently
demonstrated, employment decentralization has become the norm in
American metropolitan areas. Across the largest 100 metro areas, on
average, only 22 percent of people work within three miles of the city
center and more than 35 percent work more than ten miles from the
central core. In cities like Chicago, Atlanta and Detroit, employment
patterns have radically altered, with more than 60 percent of the
regional employment now located more than 10 miles from the city
center (Glaeser and Kahn, 2001).
The New Suburban Reality
The decentralization of American life and the changing demographics in
the country are creating new, complex metropolitan communities.
Today, five in ten Americans live in suburbs, up from three in ten in
1960. With suburbs taking on a greater share of the country’s
population, they are beginning to look more and more like urban areas.
The latest information from the 2000 Census paints a picture of dynamic
change and incredible heterogeneity – a far cry from the suburban image
fixed in our collective mind.
Suburbs are home to an expanding array of family types. As in
earlier decades, suburbs are still the preferred domains of married
couples with school-aged children – in the largest metropolitan areas,
three quarters of these households live in suburbs. Yet suburbs are also
attracting household types that only a short time ago were selecting
cities. These include young singles starting their first job, elderly persons
living alone after the death of a spouse, divorced moms with young
children, and a growing number of empty nesters who find themselves
with time (and space) on their hands when children leave for college or
work. As Figure 1 shows, every household type grew at faster rates in
the suburbs than in the cities.
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9The cumulative impact of these trends is astounding. The 2000 US
census showed that, for the first time, the suburbs contained more non-
families – people living alone or with non-relatives – than married
couples with children. In 2000, 29 percent of all suburban households
were non-families, while 27 percent were married couples with children
(Frey and Berube, 2002).
Suburbs, in general, are becoming more racially and ethnically
diverse. In many metropolitan areas, the explosive growth in
immigrants in the past decade skipped the cities and went directly to the
suburbs. Racial and ethnic minorities now make up more than a quarter
(27 percent) of suburban populations, up from 19 percent in 1990. As the
attached chart demonstrates, every minority group grew at faster rates
in the suburbs during the past decade (see Figure 2). The percentage of
each racial/ethnic group living in the suburbs, therefore, increased
substantially (see Figure 3) (Frey, 2001).
The greater Washington, D.C. area – the 5th largest magnet for
immigrants in the 1990s – demonstrates the changing spatial dynamics
of immigration. A recent study showed that 87 percent of the new
arrivals settled in suburban communities. An incredible 46 percent of
new arrivals, particularly from Asia, settled outside the area’s beltway
(traditionally the demarcation between older, urbanized communities
and newer, suburban communities) (Singer, et. al., 2001).
These demographic changes, of course, are not uniform across all
suburban jurisdictions. Most metropolitan areas in the United States
remain sharply divided along racial, ethnic and class lines. Racial
segregation, in particular, persists in the residential housing market. In
the Chicago metropolis, for example, 68 percent of African American
residents live in the central city; 90 percent live in the city and the urban
county (Cook County). In the Washington, D.C. metropolis, 66 percent
of African American residents live in Washington, D.C. and Prince
George’s County.
These patterns of racial segregation correspond closely with
metropolitan growth dynamics. In many metropolitan areas, African
American residents are increasingly living “on the wrong side of the
region”, away from areas of employment growth and educational
opportunity. In the Washington, D.C. metropolis, wealth, prosperity and
opportunity tend to be located on the western side of the region (where
few African American residents live). By contrast, the eastern side of the
region is characterized by lower employment growth, lower levels of
investment and business formation and increasing poverty
concentration in the schools (Liu and Katz, 1999).
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The Consequences of Unbalanced Growth
The shape of metropolitan growth in America has disparate impacts on
central cities, older suburbs and rapidly growing areas. Central cities,
while generally improving, remain home to the nation’s very poor.
While poverty has declined in central cities, for example, urban poverty
rates are still twice as high as suburban poverty rates, 16.4% versus 8.0%
in 1999. Cities are also disproportionately home to families whose
earnings are above the poverty level, but below median income (Berube
and Forman, 2001).
Cities are not just home to too many poor families; they are also
home to neighborhoods where poverty is concentrated. From 1970 to
1990, the number of people living in neighborhoods of high poverty –
where the poverty rate is 40% or more – nearly doubled from 4.1 million
to 8 million. As Paul Jargowsky, John Powell and others have shown,
concentrated poverty is principally an urban (and racial) phenomenon.
The implications of concentrated poverty are severe. People in these
neighborhoods often face a triple whammy: poor schools, weak job
information networks, and scarce jobs. They are more likely to live in
female-headed households and have less formal education than
residents of other neighborhoods (Jargowsky, 1997).
Yet the consequences of sprawl are not confined to central cites.
Metropolitan growth patterns are also transforming the suburbs. Like
city neighborhoods, there are a wide range of suburban experiences and
realities. Although American popular culture tends to paint a picture of
the monolithic “suburb”, the reality on the ground is infinitely more
complex.
At one end of the continuum lie suburbs built in the early or mid
part of the 20th century that are experiencing central city-like challenges –
aging infrastructure, deteriorating schools and commercial corridors,
and inadequate housing stock (Orfield, 1997). Like cities, these older
communities require reinvestment and redevelopment. As a recent
Brookings report concluded: “Many first suburbs … have older
infrastructure that suffers from age and limited maintenance.
Unfortunately, in some “home rule” states, the prevailing opinion is
“once you build it, you’re on your own”. In other words, while state
governments may be eager to assist newly developing communities on
the fringe, fully developed places are expected to manage by
themselves” (Puentes and Orfield, 2002).
The pricetag for deferred maintenance is severe. It is estimated, for
example, that over the next 30 years, southeast Michigan will need $29
billion to $52 billion to maintain and improve their sewage collection
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and treatment system. The City of South Euclid, Ohio recently estimated
that it would cost $200 million over 20 years to overhaul their storm and
sanitary systems (Puentes and Orfield, 2002).
Many of these older suburbs are also becoming home to the
working poor. These families are struggling as their wages have not kept
pace with the rising costs of housing, childcare, transportation and other
necessities of daily living. In the Atlanta metropolitan area, for example,
86 percent of the children in the central city public school system qualify
for free or reduced cost lunch (an indicator of low income). Yet the
proportion of poor children is also extremely high in such older suburbs
as DeKalb County (60 percent) and Clayton County (53 percent)
(Bradley, Katz and Liu, 2000). The city-versus-suburb idea makes little
sense in trying to describe these places, because their differences from
the cities are becoming less important than their similarities.
At the other end of the suburban continuum lie the newest ring of
suburbs that is emerging at the fringe of metropolitan areas. These
places – Loudoun County in Northern Virginia, Douglas County outside
Denver, the Route 495 corridor around Boston – are growing at a
feverish pace. Yet it is a particular kind of growth – unplanned, low-
density, and auto-dependent. For residents in these communities,
suburban prosperity has come with the heavy, unanticipated price of
traffic congestion, overcrowded schools, disappearing open space and
diminished quality of life.
Loudoun County, a boom suburb in Northern Virginia, epitomizes
this kind of place. The overall population of Loudoun, increased by 96.9
percent from 1990 to 2000; the school population increased by 78 percent
during the same period. The county school board predicts that it will
have to build 22 new schools by 2005 to accommodate an abundance of
new students. Suburbs like Loudoun simply cannot maintain their
standards. There are simply too many new people who need too much
new, expensive infrastructure – not just schools, but sewer and water
lines, libraries, fire stations, and roads.
The patterns of extensive growth in some communities and
significantly less growth in others are inextricably linked. Poor schools
in one jurisdiction push out families and lead to overcrowded schools in
other places. A lack of affordable housing in thriving job centers leads to
long commutes on crowded freeways for a region’s working families.
Expensive housing – out of the reach of most households – in many
close-in neighborhoods creates pressures to pave over and build on open
space in outlying areas, as people decide that they have to move
outwards to build a future.
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The cumulative impacts of these trends are severe. Many
American metropolitan areas are struggling with traffic problems,
environmental problems and a wide gap – both spatial and social –
between low-income people and jobs.
Traffic congestion has become a way of life in most major
metropolitan areas. A recent study by the Texas Transportation Institute
of 68 metropolitan areas in the US found that the average annual delay
per person was 36 hours or the equivalent of about one workweek of lost
time. The total congestion bill in 1999 for these places came to $78
billion, which was the value of 4.5 billion hours of delay and 6.8 billion
gallons of excess fuel consumed (Texas Transportation Institute, 2001).
Congestion and auto dependence also affect the pocketbooks of
metropolitan residents and commuters. The shape of suburban growth –
low density housing, low density employment centers – have made
residents and commuters completely dependent on the car for all travel
needs. Across the country, household spending on transportation has
risen substantially. Transportation is now the second largest expense for
most American households, consuming on average 18 cents out of every
dollar. Only shelter eats up a larger chunk of expenditures (19 cents),
with food a distant third (13 cents) (Surface Transportation Policy
Project, 2000).
The transportation burden disproportionately affects the poor and
working poor. Households earning between $12,000 and $23,000 spend
27 cents of every dollar they earn on transportation. For the very poor
(households who earn less than $12,000), the transportation burden rises
to 36 cents per dollar.
Unbalanced growth and the outward movement of metropolitan
areas has taken its toll on green space. Urbanized land increased by over
47 percent between 1982 and 1997. The pace appears to be quickening. In
the five-year period between 1992 and 1997, the pace of development
(2.2 million acres a year) was more than 1.5 times that of the previous 10-
year period (1.4 million acres a year). What is remarkable is that the
growth in urbanized land is occurring even in metropolitan areas that
lost population. The Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania metropolis lost 8 percent
of its population between 1982 and 1997; yet its urbanized land area
grew by close to 43 percent during this period (Fulton, et. al., 2001).
The broader environment suffers as metropolitan economies
decentralize and subdivisions replace forestland and prime farmland.
Researchers in Atlanta have demonstrated the powerful connection
between driving, land use and air pollution. Rapid and unbalanced
growth has also degraded the water quality of rivers and lakes because
13
of polluted runoff from new, environmentally unfriendly developments.
Deforestation threatens the health of the urban ecosystem since trees
slow stormwater, reduce runoff and improve air quality (Bradley, Katz
and Liu, 2000).
Finally, unbalanced growth has enormous social implications for
low-wage and minority workers. As economies and opportunity
decentralize and working poverty concentrates, a “spatial mismatch”
has arisen between jobs and people (Pugh, 1998). In suburbs, entry-level
jobs abound in manufacturing, wholesale trade and retailing. All offer
opportunities for people with limited education and skills, and many
pay higher wages than similar positions in the central cities. But
persistent residential racial discrimination and a lack of affordable
suburban housing effectively cut many inner city minorities off from
regional labor markets. Low rates of car ownership and inadequate
public transit keep job seekers in the core from reaching the jobs at the
fringe. Often, inner city workers, hobbled by poor information networks,
do not even know that these jobs exist.
Given the spatial mismatch, the implementation of welfare reform
appears to be a special problem in urban areas. While welfare caseloads
are shrinking in most cities, with some exceptions they are not shrinking
as quickly as they are in the states and in the nation as a whole. A city’s
share of a state’s welfare population often far outstrips its share of the
state population as a whole. Philadelphia is now home to 12 percent of
all Pennsylvanians, but 49 percent of Pennsylvanians on welfare.
Baltimore has 13 percent of Maryland’s population, but 56 percent of its
welfare recipients (Allen and Kirby, 2000).
Why Sprawl?
Sprawl is a simple term but a complex phenomenon. Consumer
preferences and market restructuring play critical roles. So do the
varying quality of schools in a metropolitan area, the location of
affordable housing and the stratification of our housing markets by race,
class and ethnicity.
Yet major federal and state spending programs, tax expenditures,
regulatory and administrative policies have also fundamentally shaped
growth patterns in metropolitan areas. Federal and state policies, taken
together, set “rules of the development game” that tend to facilitate the
decentralization of the economy and the concentration of urban poverty
(Katz and Bradley, 1999).
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Federal and state transportation spending, for example, has a
profound impact on the pace and shape of metropolitan growth.
Highway spending helps define the boundaries of metropolitan areas,
determining where households and firms can locate their homes and
facilities. In many metropolitan areas, transportation policies generally
support the expansion of road capacity at the fringe of metropolitan
areas and beyond, enabling people and businesses to live miles from
urban centers but still benefit from metropolitan life. The spatial
implications of these policies cannot be underestimated. As Marlon
Boarnet and Andrew Haughwout have written, “The evidence implies
that much of the economic impact of highways is to shift activity across
the landscape, suggesting that some local benefits are, in part, at the
expense of other places that might lose economic activity as a result of a
highway project.” (Boarnet and Haughwout, 2000).
Tax and regulatory policies have given added impetus to people’s
choices to move further and further out. The favorable tax treatment
provided to homeownership appears spatially neutral but in practice
favors higher income households and suburban communities (Gyourko
and Voith, 1997). Major environmental policies have also made the
redevelopment of urban land prohibitively expensive and cumbersome,
increasing the attraction of suburban land.
Other federal and state policies have concentrated poverty rather
than enhancing access to opportunity. Many suburban jurisdictions,
under the aegis of state law, establish zoning regulations, such as large
lot requirements for single-family homes or tight limits on land zoned
for multifamily housing, that have the practical effect of barring low-
income households. Until recently, federal public housing catered
almost exclusively to the very poor by housing them in special units
concentrated in isolated neighborhoods. More than half of public
housing residents still live in high poverty neighborhoods; only 7
percent live in low poverty neighborhoods, where fewer than 10 percent
of residents are poor (Turner, 1998). The spatial distribution of
affordable housing using federal low-income housing tax credits –
currently the main federal mechanism for stimulating the production of
affordable rental housing – may be following similar patterns. Recent
research has shown that states allocate the credits predominantly to
distressed inner city areas, thereby exacerbating the concentration of
poverty and the spatial mismatch between jobs and low income workers
(Sidor, 2002).
Even the federal housing voucher program – which, in theory,
promotes mobility among low-income recipients – has failed to offset
15
other forces leading to residential segregation. By devolving
administrative responsibility for housing vouchers to thousands of local
public housing authorities, the federal government has made it difficult
for low-income families to know about suburban housing vacancies and
exercise choice in a metropolitan housing market (Katz and Turner,
2001).
Smart Growth and The New Metropolitan Agenda
An emerging awareness of the costs of sprawl – and the role of
government policies in facilitating sprawl – is triggering an intense
debate about growth around the country. Elected officials from cities
and inner suburbs; downtown corporate, philanthropic, and civic
interests; minority and low-income community representatives;
environmentalists and land conservationists; slow-growth advocates in
the new suburbs; farmers and rural activists; and religious leaders all are
realizing that uncoordinated suburban expansion brings needless costs.
These constituencies are beginning to define, advocate for and
implement a smart growth agenda at all levels of government. This
agenda principally revolves around changing the state “rules of the
development game” to slow decentralization, promote urban
reinvestment and promote a new form of development that is mixed
use, transit-oriented and pedestrian friendly.
While the building of new coalitions is taking place at all levels,
state governments have become the principal targets of reform for many
of these coalitions. This reflects the recognition that states have the most
extensive impact on growth trends – in part because of their traditional
control over issues like land use, governance, and local taxation and in
part because of their increased powers in areas like transportation,
workforce, housing and welfare policy due to federal devolution.
In recent years, support for smart growth reforms has increased
markedly among governors and state legislatures. According to the
American Planning Association:
“More than 2000 planning bills were introduced between
1999 and 2001 with approximately 20 percent of the bills
being approved;
17 governors issued 19 executive orders on planning, smart
growth and related topics during the past two years
16
compared to 12 orders during the previous eight years
combined;
Eight states issued legislative task force reports on smart
growth between 1999 and 2001, compared to 10 reports
between 1990 and 1998
27 governors – 15 republicans, 10 democrats and 2
independents – made specific planning and smart growth
proposals in 2001” (American Planning Association, 2002).
States have, therefore, become the critical focus for creating a
smart growth framework of law, program and policy. The smart growth
agenda generally consists of five sets of complementary policies. First,
states are experimenting with new forms of metropolitan governance to
handle such issues as transportation, environmental protection, waste
management, cultural amenities, and economic development. Second,
they have embraced land use reforms to manage growth at the
metropolitan fringe. Third, they are using state resources to preserve
tracts of land threatened by sprawl as well as reclaim urban land for
productive use. Fourth, they have begun to steer infrastructure
investment and other resources to older established areas. Finally, they
are considering tax reforms to reduce fiscal disparities between
jurisdictions and reduce the competition between jurisdictions for
sprawl inducing commercial development (Katz, 1999).
Each of these reforms will be discussed in turn.
Metropolitan Governance
States are extending metropolitan governance over activities that
naturally cross borders and benefit residents of an entire region,
including transportation, land use planning, and economic
development. The most ambitious efforts are under way in Oregon and
Minnesota. These states have created multipurpose regional entities in
Portland and the Twin Cities to carry out certain operational and
planning functions. In 1978 Oregon created the Greater Portland
Metropolitan Service District, an elected body that oversees regional
transportation and land use planning, including the development and
preservation of the urban growth boundary. It also operates the mass
transit system, various parks, and cultural facilities. In the early 1990s,
Minnesota placed all regional sewer, transit, and land use planning in
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the Twin Cities area under a single entity, the Metropolitan Council. The
state’s action transformed a planning agency with a $40 million budget
into a regional authority with a $600 million annual budget.
Georgia has become the most recent state to experiment with
metropolitan governance. In early 1999, the state established the Georgia
Regional Transportation Authority, a new regional transportation
authority in the Atlanta metropolitan area with sweeping powers over
land use, transportation and development.
Growth Management
Since the early 1970s, twelve states – Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin – have enacted statewide
comprehensive planning reforms. Oregon has the most comprehensive
growth management effort in the United States. In 1973 the state enacted
the Land Conservation and Development Act to contain urban sprawl
and preserve forests and farmland. The Act requires that urban growth
boundaries be drawn around all cities throughout the state and
mandates comprehensive land use planning at both the local and
metropolitan level. The Act also requires that all city, county, and
metropolitan plans be consistent with state planning goals and
authorizes the State Land Conservation and Development Commission
to enforce compliance with the consistency requirement.
The appetite for growth management has expanded in recent
years. In 1998 Tennessee passed a law requiring counties to adopt land-
use plans that designate growth boundaries for existing municipalities
and set aside rural preservation and “planned growth areas.” If a county
does not have a land use plan in place in eighteen months, it will lose
access to some state infrastructure funds, including federal highway
grants. In 2000, Pennsylvania enacted a Growing Smarter Law. The new
law encourages land use coordination on the local, county and regional
levels and allows state agencies to grant funding priority to localities
that plan collaboratively. It allows localities to transfer development
rights within and between municipalities to where development is
desired.
Other states may follow suit within the near future. According to
the American Planning Association, nearly one-third of the states,
including non-coastal states like Colorado, Illinois and Michigan are
pursuing major statewide planning reforms (American Planning
Association, 2002).
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Land Use Reforms/Land Acquisition
In recent years, an increasing number of state governments have been
spending money to conserve land threatened by development and
cleanup land in older communities. In 1998 ballot initiatives asked
voters to approve bond measures or tax increases to preserve open space
or acquire parks and wildlife habitats in Alabama, Arizona, Florida,
Georgia, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, and
Rhode Island. All passed except Georgia’s and New Mexico’s. New
Jersey amended its constitution so that $1 billion over ten years will go
to open space conservation efforts. Taken together, the voters in 1998
approved 72 percent of ballot measures to preserve open space and
promote conservation entailing a commitment to spend $7.5 billion,
directly or indirectly, to implement these measures.
The voters’ actions continued through the 2000 election. In 2000,
for example, Ohio voters approved a $400 million Clean Ohio Fund. The
Fund represents a new style alignment between rural, urban and
suburban interests. The Fund dedicates $200 million to the conservation
and preservation of natural areas, open space and farmlands; another
$200 million is targeted for the remediation of brownfields and the
promotion of economic development (Myers and Puentes, 2001).
Infrastructure Spending
Maryland and New Jersey are in the vanguard of the movement to
target direct spending and tax incentives to communities where
infrastructure is already in place. In 1997 Maryland enacted laws to steer
state road, sewer, and school monies away from farms and open spaces
to “priority funding areas.” Some are designated in the law--Baltimore
and certain areas within the Baltimore and Washington beltways, for
example. Counties may designate other areas if they meet certain
guidelines. In 1998 New Jersey expanded on Maryland’s approach; then
Governor Christine Todd Whitman ordered state agencies to give
preference to projects in areas where infrastructure was already in place.
Such smart growth policies do not stop development or repeal the
operation of market forces; they simply control where the government
chooses to spend its resources. According to Maryland’s state planning
director, smart growth policies repeal an “insidious form of entitlement-
-the idea that state government has an open-ended obligation, regardless
of where you choose to build a house or open a business, to be there to
build roads, schools, sewers” (Pierce, 1999).
Directing state infrastructure spending to older communities can
have multiple benefits. By growing the residential and commercial base
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of existing communities, it can reduce fiscal disparities in a region and
mitigate development pressure elsewhere. By placing emphasis on
transportation policies that “fix it first”, it can leverage existing
investments in infrastructure and realize substantial savings. It is
estimated, for example, that containing growth in the Salt Lake City
metropolis will save approximately $4.5 billion in transportation, water,
sewer and utility investments (American Planning Association, 2002).
Tax Sharing
Since the 1970s, Minnesota has taken steps to reduce fiscal disparities
arising from the uneven distribution of taxable real property among
jurisdictions in the Minneapolis/St. Paul metropolitan area. Such
disparities arise from fragmented governance and would not exist if a
single government served the entire metropolitan area. The Minnesota
fiscal disparities law works as follows: 40 percent of the increment to
property tax revenues arising from the area’s commercial and industrial
development is allocated to a metropolitan pool (Orfield, 1997). Funds in
the pool – an estimated $314 million in 2002 – are then redistributed to
communities in inverse proportion to net commercial tax capacity. Such
redistribution makes economic sense since neighboring jurisdictions
generally have to deal with such negative spillover effects of
development as increased congestion but receive no tax benefit.
The Minnesota approach narrows, but does not eliminate, fiscal
disparities, and it does not guarantee that jurisdictions with the highest
expenditure needs (and highest poverty burden) receive funds from the
regional pool. Growing suburbs continue to have 25-30 percent more tax
base per household than do central cities and inner suburbs. Despite
such difficulties, interest in metropolitan resource pooling has increased
markedly over the past few years, primarily due to the work of
Minnesota State Senator Myron Orfield. In 2000, for example,
Connecticut authorized two or more municipalities to share property tax
revenues. In January 2002, the California State Assembly passed a bill
that would divide future sales tax growth in the six-county Sacramento
region.
This 5-part smart growth agenda only represents the tip of the
iceberg when it comes to state legislative and administrative efforts to
curb sprawl and promote urban reinvestment. Many states are
experimenting with efforts to stimulate redevelopment of older urban
areas. New Jersey, for example, has adopted “smart codes” that place
the renovation of existing buildings on a level playing field with new
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construction. Minnesota has passed “livable communities” legislation to
provide greater incentives for balancing growth. Vermont has become a
leader in downtown revitalization.
Finally, localities in many states are demanding that they be given
the appropriate tools and powers to grow smarter. In North Carolina,
Virginia and other states, localities are asking for a smart growth
“toolbox” that would include the powers to carry out transit oriented
development, inclusionary zoning, transfer of development rights and
other alternative development strategies.
Regional and Local Reforms
While recognizing the critical role of state policy reforms, smart growth
advocates are also trying to make substantial changes in their own
backyards. The nation abounds with examples of smart growth efforts
that are designed to affect the pace, shape and quality of growth at the
metropolitan and local level.
Some examples:
¾ Across the country, corporate and civic groups are leading
visioning efforts to chart alternative growth patterns for their
regions. In Chicago, for example, the Commercial Club, an
organization of top regional business leaders, has released the
Chicago Metropolis 2020 report, an ambitious plan for meeting
that area’s myriad growth challenges in the coming decades.
¾ New constituencies and coalitions are being formed to promote
smart growth and urban reinvestment. In Ohio, for example,
elected officials from inner suburbs around Cleveland have
formed the Northeastern Ohio First Suburbs Consortium to
discuss the common strengths, needs and problems of these
distinct places. The Consortium has initiated major cooperative
projects that address economic development and housing
renovation by collaborating with each other and sharing resources
(Puentes and Orfield, 2002).
¾ Empowered by changes in federal transportation law, some
metropolitan planning organizations (“MPOs”) are using their
new power to design and implement transportation plans that go
beyond traditional road building at the fringe. MPOs in
Chattanooga, Portland, and St. Louis are choosing to repair
existing infrastructure and invest in mass transit rather than to
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build more roads. MPOs in Philadelphia, St. Louis and Kansas
City have become regional leaders in describing the implications
of unbalanced growth (e.g., inner suburban decline) and
identifying possible solutions.
¾ Advocates and voters are using the ballot box to advance efforts to
preserve open space or build and maintain parks. In the 2000
elections, voters approved 201 of the 257 open space measures that
were on the ballot, a 78 percent approval rate. This represented a
15 percent increase in this type of measure from 1998 and a
significant increase in the approval rate. Open space measures
were on ballots in every region of the country, but the greatest
number was found in the Northeast (Myers and Puentes, 2001).
¾ In virtual revolt over congested roads, overcrowded schools, and
loss of open space, citizens of outer suburban communities of such
fast-growing metropolitan areas as northern Virginia and Seattle
have pushed county governments to increase developer fees and
scale back existing plans for residential growth.
The Challenges to Metropolitan Thinking and Smart Growth
The smart growth achievements of the past half-decade have been
remarkable in their scope and potential. Across the country, new
coalitions are being formed, legislative reforms are being pursued, and
attractive, more compact forms of urban and suburban living are being
demonstrated.
Yet the jury is still out on whether smart growth, as currently
defined and implemented, can have a measurable impact on the pace of
decentralization and the geographic scale of urbanization in the United
States. In many states and regions, the smart growth agenda is still
defined in fairly narrow terms, usually around small land preservation
and acquisition efforts. To be truly successful, smart growth will need to
address at least five distinct challenges in the coming years.
Smart growth needs to address the spatial distribution of affordable
housing
To date, few smart growth coalitions have incorporated affordable
housing issues into their reform agendas. In fact, some exurban
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communities have inappropriately used the smart growth banner to
justify the exclusion of affordable housing within their jurisdictions.
Yet the spatial distribution of affordable housing plays a central
role in shaping metropolitan growth patterns. One reason that low-
income families live in city neighborhoods of concentrated poverty is
that there is almost no affordable housing elsewhere. This is partly
because subsidized housing tends to be located in distressed inner city
neighborhoods and partly because wealthier suburbs practice
exclusionary zoning and limit affordable housing within their borders.
A smart growth agenda needs to expand housing opportunities for
middle-class families in the city and close-in suburbs while creating
more affordable housing near job centers. Working in concert, regional
elected leaders should balance the housing market through zoning
changes, subsidies, school reforms and tax incentives so that all families
– both middle class and low income – have more choice about whether
they live and how to be closer to jobs. Regions need to stimulate the
production and preservation of affordable housing for working families
in suburban communities.
A smart housing agenda will require significant policy reforms at
all levels of government. To make it easier to build housing in older
communities, cities will need to reexamine and revise local zoning rules
for downtown areas – as well as commercial and even industrial areas in
cities and older suburbs. To make it easier to rehabilitate older
buildings, states and localities will need to change their building codes.
To make it easier to renovate older homes, particularly in the inner
suburban areas of the region, the cities, older counties and the states
need to consider special loan funds – like the ones created in Minnesota,
Cuyahoga County and Cook County. To make it easier to increase
densities, states should permit – and localities should adopt – programs
that allow the transfer of development rights from greenfields to urban
communities. To make it easier to build smaller apartments, the federal
and state governments may need to provide greater access to market
capital through new credit enhancement vehicles.
New affordable housing, of course, will need to be built in fast
growing areas where jobs are increasingly concentrated. That will also
require a change in rules. The federal and state governments should
consider, for example, targeting the allocation of low income housing tax
credits to areas of growing employment, not only to areas of distress and
poverty. In addition, fast growing counties should consider adopting
inclusionary zoning ordinances that require a portion of all major
subdivision developments to be affordable to low and moderate income
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renters. Excellent examples include ordinances in counties like
Montgomery County in Maryland, Fairfax County in Virginia and King
County in Washington State (Brown, 2001).
Smart growth needs to adapt to regional diversity
Smart growth is focused, first and foremost, on changing the basic laws
and practices that govern growth patterns in 50 states and thousands of
local jurisdictions. Smart growth will, therefore, need to be fought for
simultaneously in multiple legislative arenas around the country. The
success of smart growth will ultimately depend on its adaptation to the
unique political cultures, market realities and developmental trends of a
diverse country.
States and metropolitan areas differ in multiple ways. First, there
are stark state and regional differences in growth patterns. As Bill Fulton
and Rolf Pendall have shown, many metropolitan areas in the Northeast
and Midwest – Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Milwaukee – are growing
slowly in population but rapidly in urbanized land. By contrast,
Southeastern metropolitan areas – Charlotte, Nashville, and Atlanta –
are characterized by rapid population growth, and even more rapid
growth in land consumption. Yet many Western metropolitan areas –
Las Vegas, Phoenix, Los Angeles – are actually experiencing increases in
land density while accommodating large amounts of population growth
(Fulton, et. al., 2001).
These regional differences in growth patterns confound
conventional wisdom about “who sprawls most” in the United States.
As Fulton and Pendall have written, “It is especially significant to note
that the goal of efficient land utilization is being achieved in one region
of the country that is commonly perceived to be sprawling – the West –
but not in those parts of the nation that are commonly perceived not to
have a sprawl problem – the Northeast and the Midwest.” Several
factors – significant environmental and regulatory barriers to growth in
the West, the different patterns of federal ownership of land in the
United States – account for this regional diversity in development
patterns.
Second, states differ on the level of governmental fragmentation
and (a related point) the extent of power that is devolved to local
jurisdictions. In many states, particularly in the Northeast and Midwest,
there are literally hundreds of localities in a metropolitan area, each one
vested with the power to make critical decisions over land use, zoning
and taxation. In other states (particularly in the south), there are
(perhaps) 5 to 10 counties in a given metropolitan area. Many of these
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county governments have weak powers and are required to “ask
permission” of the state legislature before pursuing innovative smart
growth efforts (e.g., public transit extension, inclusionary zoning,
transfer of development rights, etc.).
Finally, the political foundation for smart growth is highly uneven
around the country. In states like Maryland and Oregon, organizations
like the Chesapeake Bay Foundation or the 1000 Friends of Oregon have
a long institutional history and reflect the environmental interests of
many residents and voters. In other states, however, environmental and
conservation organizations are relatively new, poorly staffed and not as
powerful.
These differences in regional growth patterns, governmental
fragmentation and political organization set the basic context for smart
growth responses and, by necessity, require different approaches. The
success of smart growth will depend ultimately on the ability of political
leaders and advocates to tailor solutions to the distinct conditions of the
regions in which they operate.
Smart growth needs to engage more systemic reforms at federal level
To date, the smart growth movement has focused the bulk of its
attention on state, regional and local reforms. Yet, as discussed above,
federal policies also play an important role in shaping growth patterns
by facilitating exurban sprawl and concentrating poverty in central
cities. A federal smart growth agenda must, therefore, be defined and
implemented.
Some positive changes did occur in the past decade. Federal
transportation laws in the early and late 1990s supported smart growth
efforts by (1) devolving greater responsibility to metropolitan entities;
(2) giving state and regional decisionmakers the flexibility to use
highway funds for transit purposes; and (3) directly funding alternative
transportation strategies. Under the Clinton Administration,
enforcement of the Clean Air Act and Endangered Species Act
compelled various regions (e.g., Atlanta) to pursue alternatives to
conventional sprawl-inducing activities. Public housing reforms led to
the demolition of the most troubled projects in the country and
promoted economic integration and “new urbanist” design in new
developments. Federal ownership of lands in western states often curb
excessive decentralization by acting as de facto urban growth
boundaries.
Yet much more needs to be done. The federal government should
continue its reform efforts in the transportation arena. More power and
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responsibility should be devolved to metropolitan planning
organizations, which are closer to the transportation challenges faced by
metropolitan areas. Federal transportation funds should also be used in
metropolitan areas almost exclusively for the repair and maintenance of
existing highways and for the expansion of alternative transportation
strategies that relieve congestion and promote more balanced growth
patterns. Federal funds should be used to build new highways in
metropolitan and adjoining areas only in exceptional circumstances.
The federal government should also consider extending
metropolitan governance beyond the transportation arena.
Metropolitan-wide administration makes sense in areas like housing,
work force and economic development. The federal government should,
in particular, shift governance of the housing voucher program to the
metropolitan level. Such consolidation would make it easier for low-
income voucher recipients to exercise choice in the metropolitan housing
market (Katz and Turner, 2001).
The federal government should use the tax code to invest smartly.
Federal homeownership tax incentives should be expanded to boost
homeownership in areas where homeownership rates lag far behind the
national average. Such incentives would enhance the ability of working
families to build equity and contribute to the stability of neighborhoods
by lowering the costs of homeownership. Such incentives would also
expand the incentives for the production of affordable housing, either
through new building or renovation of existing homes (Retsinas and
Belsky, 2000).
Finally, the federal government has an important role to play as a
provider of demographic, market and programmatic information. The
federal government should provide metropolitan areas with a clear
spatial analysis of how federal resources are allocated. The Department
of Commerce, for example, should show the extent to which individual
jurisdictions in major metropolitan areas benefit from federal
procurement decisions. The Department of Transportation should,
likewise, annually display the spatial distribution of federal
transportation dollars in states and metropolitan areas. Disclosure of
federal spending patterns is not an onerous burden; in fact, it will
subject federal bureaucracies to the same standards that now govern
private institutions like banks and thrifts. The Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act requires every depository institution to disclose their
lending patterns by race, space and income. If the federal government
can require banks to disclose where they lend, why can’t the federal
government require bureaucracies to disclose where they spend?
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Smart growth will depend on city reform
Smart growth requires metropolitan areas to focus intently on density in
housing and more clustering in office, retail, and commercial and
residential spaces. Yet many newer suburbs remain opposed to such
changes in land use patterns. If smart growth is to succeed, therefore,
central cities and older suburbs will need to become places of choice for
businesses and residents. That will require cities to alter their
relationship with the market economy and enact substantial reforms in
local policies and practices.
Despite signs of urban renaissance and renewal, cities still remain
difficult places to do business. Basic information that drives market
activity (e.g., who has title to land) is rarely available in a transparent
manner. Multiple city bureaucracies often have overlapping
responsibilities for related activities (e.g., the acquisition and disposition
of vacant properties). Instead of streamlining city government and
creating a climate for business investment, most cities have pursued a
fairly narrow vision of urban policy. They have spent most of the past
decade building the Consumer City, focusing on downtown
revitalization, stadia building, and convention center expansions and
hotel development. While these strategies have generated sales tax
revenues and helped change the image of the city, they have not
generated the kind of high wage job base that is critical to long-term
economic vitality.
The Brookings Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy has
identified five competitive strategies that urban leaders can pursue to
substantially improve the economic, fiscal and social health of their core
economies. First, cities need to fix the basics that determine business and
residential location. These fundamentals include such elements as good
schools, safe streets, competitive taxes, efficient services and a
transparent and effective system for the redevelopment of land and
infrastructure.
Second, cities need to build on their assets and play in the real
economy. These assets generally include fixed institutions (e.g.,
universities, hospitals), other urban employment clusters, downtown
business districts, cultural and recreational areas and waterfront
locations.
Third, cities need to create quality neighborhoods. Such places are
livable and distinctive and offer a range of housing, transportation,
commercial and recreational choices to low-, moderate- and middle-
income families.
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Fourth, cities need to reward work and build family wealth. For
many city residents, the income from work is simply not sufficient to
cover the costs of housing, health care, childcare, transportation and
other necessities of daily living.
Finally, cities need to influence metropolitan growth. Cities can do
this both through the local actions defined above (which make them
more competitive places for businesses and families) and through
advocating change in state and federal policies that facilitate sprawl and
economic decentralization.
City reform efforts, of course, will not come easy. They will require
sustained efforts by local coalitions of corporate, civic, political and
community leaders. They will require reforms that are tailored to the
political, market and demographic realities of different cities. Yet, in
many respects, the success of smart growth depends on whether cities
can “get their act together” and once again become places where large
numbers of businesses decide to locate and people choose to live.
Smart growth must recognize the central role of race
As discussed above, race continues to play a central role in shaping
metropolitan growth patterns in the United States. Race has
fundamentally influenced the policies of exclusion that are practiced by
suburbs throughout the country. These policies have exacerbated the
concentration of racial poverty in the central cities and helped construct
the metropolitan dividing lines that separate areas of wealth and
opportunity from areas of poverty and distress. As John Powell has
written, “Concentrated poverty should be understood as racial and
economic segregation combined. It is the segregation of poor people of
color from opportunity and resources” (Powell, 1999).
In the past, the racial divide was perceived as affecting only the
central city and close in suburbs. Yet the racial divide has also placed
enormous pressures on growing counties. In many respects, sprawl is
the inevitable flip side of racial segregation and social exclusion. Race
shapes growth patterns and drives business and residential decisions in
ways that no single other factor can match.
Bridging the racial divide will require leadership, vision and
courage on the part of key constituencies. Smart growth advocates, for
example, will need to move beyond the relatively “safe ground” of open
space acquisition, environmental protection and infrastructure
investment. If they are serious about curbing sprawl, they will need to
embrace and push fundamental changes in regional housing policies,
against the opposition of many suburban citizens.
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Yet African American leaders also need to come to the regional
table and advocate for progressive metropolitan solutions. With a few
exceptions (Denver Mayor Wellington Webb, Rochester Mayor Bill
Johnson, King County Executive Ron Sims), most black elected officials
do not lead or even participate much in smart growth conversations at
the metropolitan or state level. The absence of the traditional civil rights
community from smart growth discussions is even more pronounced.
As John Powell has written, many African American leaders remain
highly suspicious of metropolitan efforts (Powell, 2000). That suspicion
may date back to efforts to consolidate cities and counties in the 1970s,
but it is an impediment to political coalition building that needs to be
addressed.
Racial divisions in the United States, of course, will not be solved
overnight. But progress on metropolitan issues like transportation,
housing, fiscal disparities and economic investment will mitigate the
divisions in substantial ways. In the end, the smart growth agenda is the
first effort in years that offers an alternative vision to development
patterns that have isolated the racial poor and undermined the economic
and fiscal vitality of cities and inner suburbs.
Conclusion
The smart growth movement has the potential to change the landscape
of metropolitan America and, in the process, build stronger cities,
sustainable regions and more inclusive communities. It has the power to
unite formerly disparate constituencies – environmentalists, land
conservationists, farm preservationists, community development
advocates, downtown business interests – into a strong, sustainable
force for change. It has the ability to build new kinds of political
coalitions that cross-parochial borders and move beyond current racial
and ethnic divisions.
In many respects, smart growth is a movement whose time has
come. The changing demographics of the country, the restructuring of
the market economy, the rise of congestion, the backlash to excessive
suburbanization – all support the desire for a different pattern of
growth, a different ethos about growth, than the one that has dominated
the American landscape since the end of the second world war.
Yet the smart growth movement is in its infancy. The movement’s
success will not be measured by what laws it enacts or energy it
galvanizes in a three or five or even ten-year period. The reshaping of
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American metropolitan areas will be an activity that spans decades and
generations – just as the current pattern of sprawl has played out over
the last half century. This is the true “permanent campaign” in America
that will require persistence, discipline and courage.
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